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BY MARGARET A. LEARY, DIRECTOR
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL LAW LIBRARY

t's well known that graduate William B. Cook's generosity
provided the Law School with its trademark Gothic Law
Quadrangle. It is less universally known that Cook endowed the
Law School with atrust to support faculty research, and had a
strong interest in the nature of that research. He chose to call the
library building "Legal Research" and to inscribe above the main
entrance "Learned and cultured lawyers are safeguards of the
republic." Cook often said that the lack of "intellectual leadership is
the greatest problem which faces America," and he wanted this
Law School to provide that missing leadership.
Judging from the books highlighted in the following pages,
Cook's vision and the Law School's commitment to his goal have
provided fertile ground to produce top rank, cutting edge research,
scholarship, and writing.
Taken together, the books published by our faculty and
graduates are important both for the influence they will have on the
profession and for what they reveal about the importance of
libraries to the scholarly endeavor. Put another way: these books
will become part of many libraries, personal and institutional.
(A listing of faculty members' publications from 1998-2001 begins
on page 47.)
And these publications were born in part as a result of the
authors' use of library collections and the talents of librarians.
Elsewhere in this issue (see story on page 29) there is a
description of the ways in which the Allan F. and Alene Smith
Addition enabled the Law Library to expand its services. One of
the library's highest priorities has been to become more engaged in
the intellectual life of the Law School, and to support faculty
research. Because we work so hard on our service, and on
developing and maintaining the historical and current strengths of
the collection, we consider these books, and all other publications
of the faculty, as our indirect work product.
The intellectual and historical sweep of the books discussed
here is astonishing. These books range from a casebook
for law teaching, with numerous references to cases and statutes,
to three books whose titles don't hint at being written by lawyers.
Each of the seven exhibits a consideration of the laws or customs
of other nations or civilizations, and attention to disciplines other
than law. Two are explicitly about international law.
Each year, the Library delivers an average of 100 items to each
faculty member, and one third of these come from other campus
libraries, not the Law Library. Why is this? A close look at the
material cited in these books gives the answer.
International Law: Christine Chinkin and Brian Simpson both
write about rights from an international perspective. Simpson's
research about the creation of the European Convention on Human
Rights relied extensively on archives in Great Britain, but his 4,360
footnote references and 34-page bibliography include many treaties
as well as cases and statutes from many countries. Chinkin also
focuses on international law and human rights, but with special
attention to the need to end the silence about women in
discussions of UN reform.Chinkin and her colleagues compiled a
41-page bibliography and 16-page table of cases, plus 14 pages of

references to treaties and other international agreements, ranging
from the 1899 Convention for Pacific Settlemen,t of Disputes to
the 1999 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Sex Equality Casebook: The attention to feminism continues
in Catharine A. MacKinnon's hefty, 1651-page work that centers
on case law in the United States, but goes far beyond what a
casebook would have been 30 years ago - when there would not
have been a casebook on sex equality. This book includes
constitutional, statutory, comparative, and international materials,
including foreign law examples, in translation where needed:
South Africa, Canada, aboriginal law, CEDAW, Brazil, Europe,
and England.
Law and the Humanities: William I. Miller has used soldiers'
memoirs to explore the meaning of courage, in the context of
many wars and framed with concepts from Icelandic sagas,
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Shakespeare, and drawing from cultural
psychology and other writing about courage. There are no
references to primary law - statutes, cases, regulations. Philip
Soper explores deference, from that which appellate courts
accord to more personal and historical examples. He, too, refers
to early philosophers such as Plato and Socrates, and cites books
and journals in law, philosophy, political science, and ethics.
There are cites to a few court opinions, and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. J.B. White explores "meaning" not just in
law, but in literature, philosophy, and painting. He explores texts
and visual presentations to see how "a mind can be seen trying to
imagine the world, and the self within it ... to make possible
coherent speech and valuable action" - surely a goal shared
by every lawyer.
Law and Medicine: The one book in this special section on
law and medicine, edited by Carl E. Schneider, collects the
thinking of doctors, lawyers, ethicists, and the general public to
explore law and the end of life. The authors include a lawyer who
is also a genetics counselor, a professor of law and medicine, a
physician, a comparative and international law scholar, a medical
historian, and a sociologist. The sources include newspapers,
court reports from the United States and abroad, law review
articles, oral arguments and briefs submitted to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and commentary on the Court by doctors and
philosophers.
William W. Cook gave money for buildings and a research
endowment to the Michigan Law School. The Cook Trust has
supported faculty research for decades. In 1934, the School
hoped "eventually to have a collection of law books which will
permit scholars to do research work in any field of law, regardless
of country or period." Judging from the scholarship represented
in this issue, the hope has been realized.
Cook could not have envisioned these specific books. Nor,
indeed, could he have foreseen in detail the variety and breadth of
research and learning that would take place here. His vision
indeed was even larger - to make it all possible.

is director of the Law
Library. From 1973 to
1981, she served as
assistant director and
from 1982 through
1984 as associate
director. In 1988-89
she served as president
of the American
Association of Law
Libraries. Lear1
received a B.A. from
Cornell University, an
M.A. from the
University of Minnesota
School of Library
Science, and a J.D. from
the William Mitchell
College of Law. An
adjunct faculty member,
she teaches Advanced
Legal Research.
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AFFILIATED OVERSEAS FACULTY,
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS,
LONDON, ENGLAND

his book is a continuation of an article by
myself, Hilary Charlesworth and Shelley Wright in 1991,
Mmm S(ttlll S11Jal(S IN
"Feminist Approaches to International Law." We were then all
in Australian law schools teaching a range of international
law, human rights, and feminist courses. The article was a
response to a deep feeling of frustration with the apparent
impermeability of international law to any form of feminist
analysis and a consequent feeling of alienation from our
discipline.
We proposed a single panel at a conference in Canberra
on the subject, and then found ourselves having to think of
A fecninist analv:is
what to say. Once we began looking at the international legal
system from a feminist perspective, drawing upon a
developing international relations literature, we found it to be
deeply gendered. The panel had amixed reception, but
resulted in a full day conference on the subject a year later
- as far as we know the first of its kind.
This fledgling academic venture coincided with
significant events within the UN system around which women
organized globally to ensure the inclusion of their interests:
the Rio conference on the environment (1992); the Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights (1993) with its assertion
that "women's rights are human rights"; the campaign to
assert that failure to prevent and punish violence against women engaged state responsibility and other global conferences
on population, social development, and, most importantly, the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women (1995).
International institutions began slowly to realize the importance of including women within their planning and
execution of programs in what has become known as "mainstreaming." At the same time, the war in Bosnia and the
genocide in Rwanda brought to the world's (belated) attention the commission of widespread and egregious crimes against
women - committed because they were women. While women have long suffered sexual abuse and rape in armed conflict
on these occasions, there were demands that the perpetrators be brought to account.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established by the Security Council in 1993 and that
for Rwanda in 1994. By 2001 both have made significant rulings on rape as awar crime and on genocidal rape as a crime
against humanity, as well as being constitutive of torture and enslavement as crimes against humanity. Both Hilary
Charlesworth and I were involved in work with non-governmental and international organizations with legal aspects of
these developments, as well as participating in conferences and seminars on what had become a growing area
of consideration.
Our aim in writing this book was to reflect upon these, and other, incidents of the inclusion of women within
international legal thinking. We have sought to provide atheoretical and critical account, informed by our activism, of the
global position of women and of how the international legal system has traditionally been blind to its implications for
international legal doctrine, procedures, and methodologies, and how this might be changed.
We have attempted to examine the same issues as are found in any international law text - sources of law, treaties,
statehood, self-d~termination, jurisdiction, state responsibility, human rights, the use of force and the peaceful settlement of
disputes - but rt_Jr goal is to show how incorporating gender as an analytical tool might assist in creating a more
balanced and just system.

international law

The boundaries
of international law

Hilary Charlesworth
Christine Chin kin

FROM
"International institutions," in The boundaries
of international law: A feminist analysis,
by Hilary Charlsworth and Christine Chinkin,
Manchester University Press (2000).

on the UN's renaissance
prompted by the end of the cold war and the reformist writings
generated by the UN's fiftieth anniversary almost entirely ignored one
of the most significant problems facing this institution as it enters the
twenty-first century - its exclusion and marginalisation of women.
The general silence about women in discussions of UN reform has
made issues of sex and gender appear irrelevant to the process.
The issue of the absence of women from UN decision-making
processes, however, cuts across all the commonly identified concerns
about the future of the UN: the UN's role in international security,
peacekeeping and election monitoring, its bureaucratic inefficiency
and financial accountability, the position of the Secretary-General,
the protection of human rights and the environment, the promotion of
economic development, and the membership of and relationship
between the various UN bodies and institutions. Examination of the
way sex and gender have affected UN structures and work therefore
allows new perspectives on the standard list of concerns. Spike
Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan have described the significance of a
"gender-sensitive lens" in world politics. They have argued that it can
transform the simple observation of the presence of men and the
absence of women to an awareness that "women are in fact an
important part of the picture even though they are obscured when we
focus on the men," and further to an understanding that
"constructions of masculinity are ... dependent upon, opposing
constructions of femininity." In this sense, the very categories into
which the UN's work is compartmentalized and analyzed - security,
peacekeeping, human rights, and economic development - are shaped
by sex and gender. They are all constructs largely defined by male
experiences. Indeed, the presence of men in the UN system can be
seen as contingent on the absence of women.
BOTH THE REVIVALIST LITERATURE

is Professor of International Law
at the London School of
Economics. Formerly dean of the
law faculty at the University of
Southampton and a member of
the law faculty at the University
of Sydney, she has been a senior
or guest lecturer on international
law and human rights at the
National University of Singapore,
Hong Kong University Law School,
the International Law Institute of
China, and the University of
Tasmania. She is the author of
(with Hilary Charlesworth} The
Boundaries of International Law
(2000}, Third Parties in
International Law and the coauthor of Dispute Resolution in
Australia, as well as a member of
the editorial board of the
American Journal of International
Law. She has acted as a consultant
on gender and human rights to
the Commonwealth Secretariat
and on international law to the
Asian Development Bank, as well

as to a number of NGOs. She was
rapporteur to the working group
on gender-based persecution of
the Division for the Advancement
of Women. Professor Chinkin's
teaching and research interests
include public international law,
human rights (especially the
international protection of
women's rights}, alternative
dispute resolution, and
international criminal law.
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ELIZABETH A. LONG PROFESSOR OF LAW

Equality, the book, began
in 1979 with the idea of teaching a course on
sex equality under law through the concrete
problems that define sex inequality in social life,
instead of through the legal and other
abstractions that customarily structure
law courses.
The first half interrogated and reconfigured
the existing canon in these terms; the second
half reframed areas of law central to the reality
of sex inequality, like family and rape, that are
virtually untouched by sex equality principles.
Updated and revised annually, this design
remained to publication in 2001.
In the intervening period, the analysis and
cases were expanded and refined through my
practice and teaching in Canada and elsewhere
to include comparative examples, and, as my
practice became increasingly international in the
1990s, encompassed international law as well.
I realized that I had to write the book, not
just teach the course, when one of my best
students told me in the mid-1980s that she
couldn't teach the course from the materials
alone. The writing was fueled by global
frustration with litigation on issues of women's
rights, where so little of the reality appears and
so little equality is produced. I hope the book will
contribute to reversing both trends.

FROM
Chapter 1, "Equality," in Sex Equality,
by Catharine A. MacKinnon
Foundation Press (2001).
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
EQUALITY IN HUMAN SOCIETIES is commonly affirmed but rarely

practiced. As a principle, it can be fiercely loved, passionately sought, highly
vaunted, sentimentally assumed, complacently taken for granted, and legally
guaranteed. Its open detractors are few. Yet despite general consensus on
equality as a value, no society is organized on equality principles. Few lives
are lived in equality, even in democracies. As an act, social equality is hard
to find anywhere.
Social inequality, by contrast, is seldom defended but widely practiced.
Common among men - vast disparities in wealth are one evidence - social
inequality is nowhere more apparent than between women and men as
groups. The inequality of women relative to men varies in extent, form,
and degree by time and place, but the sexes are equal nowhere, by any
measure.... The second-class status of women as a group is widely
documented to be socially and legally institutionalized, cumulatively and
systematically shaping access to life chances on the basis of sex. As a result,
women, compared with men, are deprived of access to many measures and
markers of social worth, including dignity, respect, resources, security,
authority, credibility, speech, power, and full citizenship. The group women,
composed of all its variations, has a collective social history of group-based
devaluation, disempowerment, exploitation, and subordination that extends
to the present...
A potent combination of social and political mechanisms enforces this
pattern. Political science Professor Robert Dahl observes, "[T]he
subordination of women [is] institutionalized and enforced by an
overwhelming array of the most powerful forces available [including]
individual and collective terror and violence; official and unofficial law;
law, custom, and convention; and social and economic structures [and is]
backed up by the state itself." ... Given this analysis of interlocking forces
supporting sex inequality, what interventions will produce sex equality is
an open question.
Unless something is done, even if recent rates of measurable progress for
elite women continue, no American now alive will live in a society of sex
equality, nor will their children or their children's children. Pamela
McCorduck and Nancy Ramsey estimate by linear projection that top
corporations will be sex-equal by 2270, Congress by 2500 .... But will these
changes stop rape? End domestic violence against women? Produce an equal
income for the average woman? Integrate combat forces? Guarantee that
women's vpice and experience shapes culture and policy? Eliminate
discriminatjon against gay men and lesbian women? Make abortions rare?
CONTINUED

is the Elizabeth A. Long
Professor of Law. She holds a
B.A. from Smith College, a J.D.
from Yale Law School, and a
Ph.D. in political science from
Yale University. MacI<innon,
who is admitted to the bar in
Connecticut and practices and
consults nationally and
internationally, has also taught
at Yale, the University of
Chicago, UCLA, Minnesota,
Harvard, York (0sgoode Hall),
Stanford, and Basel (Switzerland).
Her fields of concentration
include constitutional and
international law, with
specialization in sex equality
issues, and political theory.
Professor MacI<innon is the
author of numerous articles and
books, including Sex Equality
(2001), Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State (1989} and
Only Words (1993). She has
represented Muslim and Croat
women survivors of Serbian
genocidal sexual atrocities pro
bono since 1992, winning with
co-counsel an award of damages
of $ 745 million from a New York
jury in August 2000. Their case
also pioneered the recognition
of rape as an act of genocide
under international law. See
Kadic v. Karadzic,70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 518
U.S. 1005 (1996).
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Continued, CATHARINE A. MacKINNON

Make prostitution wither away?
Elect a woman president? What
must change for sex equality to be
achieved? In your answer, are
some parts of the problem more
central or harder to change than
others? If so, why? Should some
of these areas be left alone? Do
you see a way to accomplish the
changes you envision? Is there a
role for law in your strategy?
Sex equality is often guaranteed
by law, including where sex
inequality is pervasive in society.
More imagined than real in life,
sex equality in law tends to be
more formal or hypothetical than
substantive and delivered. In legal
applications, the meaningfulness
of sex equality guarantees varies
dramatically, its observance
ranging from obvious to
anathema. Around the world, and
through history, in settings from
the institutional to the intimate,
sex equality remains more
promise than fact.
In the words of philosopher
Richard Rorty, to be a woman "is
not yet the name of a way of
being human." ... His formulation
at once recognizes that women's
lives would not be "human" by
the standards set by men, and
that women's reality has not been
reflected in the standard for what
"human" is. It invites redefinition
of the human standard in the
image of women's realities and
unrealized possibilities, as well as
proposes change in women's
situation to meet the existing
standard of a "human" life. Can
one challenge the validity of a
standard and assert a right to the
benefits of application at the same
time? Are women "human"?
8 THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

THOMAS G. LONG PROFESSOR OF LAW

William Ian Miller
Author of The Anatomy of Disgust
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ourage.
Most of us would prefer being
known to have it than any other
virtue; for if you have it you secure
for yourself and loved ones the peace
and space to develop the other
virtues.
I was moved to write this book
for a whole mess of motives, only
some of which I will avow:
• Because I wanted to understand
why I always felt I came up short
when it came to courage;
• Because I felt I owed an apology
to the guys I looked down on
who went and fought a war back
in the '60s which I still feel was
never explained or justified
adequately to the public.
So here follow some words from
the book which, given our lost sense
of security and innocence in light of
Pearl Harbor II of Sept. 11, 2001,
turns out to have a more pressing
relevance than it had when I wrote it
a couple of years ago.

FROM
the chapter "Moral Courage and Civility." Reprinted by permission of the publisher
from The Mystery of Courage by William Ian Miller, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press ©2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.
WHY DID IT TAKE UNTIL THE NINETEENTH CENTURY for English
speakers to name a distinction between physical and moral courage? The
answer though complex in the particulars is fairly easy to summarize in a
rough way. There is little need to carve out a notion of moral courage in an
age in which it was so clearly understood that courage of whatever sort
meant that your body was ultimately at risk. The solitary woman who
opposed those denouncing a witch stood a good chance of being burned as
one herself. It is only when people can rely on not being killed or beaten for
voicing unpopular opinions that physical fears can be separated from fears of
rejection, ridjcule, and disgrace. No need to call Socrates physically
courageous during the retreat at Delium and morally courageous while in
prison resisting temptations to connive with what he considered to be
ignoble and unjust opportunities to escape. Plain courage would do in both
cases, for in both instances he exposed himself to physical extinction. But by
the nineteenth century in western Europe the upper and middle classes had
become secure enough in their persons that people could undertake to
support unpopular causes, to stand up against injustice and not die or be
imprisoned. The price they paid was loss of social standing, being despised
by "decent" people. This often entailed serious economic costs - loss of job,
relocation - and the psychological costs of knowing oneself so despised; but
they were spared the scourge, which at times may have seemed preferable.
Moral courage owes its distinguishability from the larger domain of
courage to several converging influences. The civilizing process, commercial
culture, and more effective government and law all combined to pacify the
public order. Civility and public order are good things. But some worried
that courage would get rarer when noncontention, tolerance, and polite
accommodation replaced a most punctiliously sensitive and aggressive honor.
In the older cultures of honor, courage was always testing itself. The ethic of
revenge meant one had to posture fearlessly even if actual lethal encounters
were often nipped in the bud by friends or by other intervenors who
negotiated peace. To be too ready to accommodate and forgive was cowardly;
people were not so willing to praise your sweetness of spirit if they suspected
it was a mask for pusillanimity. In the commercial world, however, people
had better things to do than avenging past slights. Men's interest became
strongly biased toward future opportunity rather than toward past offense,
and not just the short-term future either, but a future long enough for thirtyyear bonds to mature. Peaceful public order did not prevent men from
importing the diction of battle into finance or from trying to convince
themselves.that it took courage to make money, but some gestures were
obviously and embarrassingly compensatory efforts, fantasies of manliness to
make up for the unmanning that people feared luxury and peace had effected.

holds a Ph.D. (in English) and a
J.D. from Yale University.
Professor Miller has written
extensively on the bloodfeud,
especially as it is manifested in
saga Iceland. In the last few
years he has turned his
attention to the emotions of
social and moral stratification
and most recently to at least
one virtue - courage, which
provides the theme of his latest
book: The Mystery of Courage
{2000). Other books include
The Anatomy of Disgust {1997)
(chosen best book in
anthropology/sociology by the
Association of American
Publishers); Humiliation {1993,
paperback 1995); and
Bloodtaking and Peacemaking:
Feud, Law, and Society in Saga
Iceland {1990). Professor Miller
is the Thomas G. Long Professor
of Law.
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ocqueville famously said,
"Scarcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question."
Physician-assisted suicide exemplifies
Tocqueville's characteristically acute
observation. Assisted suicide was once
the model of a (nonpartisan) political
question. Interest groups brought it to
public attention. Public discussion of it
flourished. Legislatures debated it.
Citizens voted in r~ferenda about it.
• But this classic political process was
transformed by startling and stringent
opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals, which found in the
constitutional right of privacy an
entitlement to the help of a physician in
committing suicide. Now, in a case called
G/ucksberg v. Washington, the Supreme
Court has reversed the decisions of the
Second and Ninth Circuits.
When the political becomes judicial,
the debate changes. It falls into the hands of lawyers, and arguments must be cognizable by the l;iw. Anyone may
have an opinion about good public policy in matters of ordinary experience; it is hard to know what the Constitution
requires without knowing a gruesomely large body of precedent. Yet when an issue becomes judicial, public interest
persists. People hope to change the result. Sometimes they try to persuade the court to overrule itself or to erode
its precedent. Sometimes they seek room in the judicial decision for legislative and social countermeasures.
The political and the judicial become so intertwined that anyone interested in the political must understand the judicial.
But that understanding is elusive. The judicial approach to political problems and the language courts employ in
discussing them seem arcane, abstruse, and artificial to the laity. Even though America is an exceptionally
judicialized country, the constraints, purposes, and discourse characteristic of courts are widely misunderstood.
Thus we need a discourse which offers the public sophisticated explanation and criticism of judicial opinions.
To provide this explanation and criticism, the University of Michigan Law School and the University of Michigan
Program in Society and Medicine sponsored a conference on G/ucksberg on November 14-15, 1997, a few months
after the case was decided. It solicited views from people of varied backgrounds, including a physician, a medical
historian, and a medical sociologist. Even the lawyers had varied experiences. Two were conventional lawyerbioethicists (I was one), one had been a genetic counsellor (Sonia Suter, '94), one was an expert in criminal
procedure and constitutional law (Professor Yale Kamisar), one was a Ph.D. in economics who specializes in antitrust law (Professor Peter Hammer, '89), and one was an English scholar of comparative law (Professor
Christopher Mccrudden).
The conference papers then, asked what the Court's opinion in Glucksberg means as a judicial decision that is
part of a continuing political process; criticized the opinion as a piece of legal analysis, as a social document, and
as guidelines for the practice of medicine; reflected on the principles that should animate legal thinking about
assisted suicide; and discussed how institutional authority to make policy should be allocated among and wielded
by governmental institutions.
This book ii the result of those discussions.

FROM
"Making Biomedical Policy through Constitutional Adjudication:
The Example of Physician-Assisted Suicide," by Carl E. Schneider,
in (Carl E. Schneider, ed.) Law at the End of Life,
University of Michigan Press (2000).
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
I HAVE ARGUED THAT CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION is a poor

way to make bioethical policy. My reasons have been several. First,
little in the training or experience of judges prepares them to make
good public policy in most areas, including this one. Second, little in
the text or even the history of the Fourteenth Amendment helps judges
make good bioethical policy. Nor has the Court been able to develop
doctrine that has a convincing rationale or that seems to help it
formulate wise policy. Such a doctrine would require that the Court be
able to explain the principles it was consulting, would specify the
limits on those principles, would state workable tests to employ in
applying them, and would use those tests reasonably and predictably.
Such a doctrine remains elusive.
Third, constitutional litigation is a poor way to gather the social
facts necessary for making good public policy, and many judges even
doubt they need them. This has meant courts have not demonstrated
that they understand the issues assisted suicide raises. For example, the
Ninth Circuit seems not to have grasped how doctors and ethicists have
understood the doctrine of double effect nor the consequences of
rejecting that doctrine. It seems not to know where the problem in
defining "terminally ill" lies nor how hard it is do so. It appears not to
have understood how common depression is among the suicidal, how
often it goes undiagnosed, or how treatable it is. It seems to have a
nai:ve view of human motivation generally, of the motives of the ill
particularly, and yet more particularly, of the motives of the suicidal.
It seems not to realize why people worry about the disadvantaged in a
world where assisted suicide is a constitutional right. It does not seem
to perceive the ways new economic concerns and new organization
structures create new incentives to hasten the dying along their way. It
seems oddly optimistic about how well doctors might regulate the
process of suicide. The court seems ignorant of the contemporary ethos
of medicine, of the way medical decisions are made, of how doctors
deal with patients, of the reasons for the origins of bioethics, and of
the regulatory problems Holland has yet to solve. Nor does much in the
court's information prepare it to speculate intelligently about how a
new regime will work out in practice.
What is more, the judicial formulas systematically underweight the
state's interests. Some of those interests, as I just said, courts seem not
to understand. Less concrete but still important factors - the state's
CONTINUED

is the Chauncey Stillman Professor of
Ethics, Morality, and the Practice of
Law and Professor of Internal
Medicine. He was educated at HaIVard
College and the University of Michigan
Law School (where he was editor-inchief of the Michigan Law Review).
He served as law clerk to Judge Carl
McGowan of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and
to Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S.
Supreme Court. He became a member
of the Law School faculty in 1981 and
of the Medical School faculty in 1998.
Professor Schneider has written
extensively in several fields, including
bioethics, professional ethics,
professional education, family law, and
constitutional law. He recently
published The Practice of Autonomy:
Patients, Doctors, and Medical
Decisions, Oxford University Press
(1998). He continues his study of the
interaction between American law and
American culture in an influential
series of articles on moral discourse
and family law. Professional education
is another of Professor Schneider's
interests. He has lectured and written
about legal education in several
countries. He is the author of an
innovative family law casebook An Invitation to Family Law, West
(1996) (with Margaret F. Brinig) a second edition of which is about to
appear. And he is currently preparing a
law and bioethics casebook (with
Marsha Garrison).
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CHARLES F. AND EDITH J. CLYNE
PROFESSOR OF LAW

"collective" interests - courts
abruptly dismiss. And courts are
not equipped to evaluate the
cumulative costs of the rights it
and other institutions create.
Furthermore, the court has found
no principled way to gauge the
heft of the individual's right or
the state interests so as to weigh
the two against each other. On
the contrary, the balance is
unduly weighted in favor of the
individual's rights by the judicial
tendency to -a pply the Mill
paradigm, to treat every context as
one between the individual and
the state rather than as a
conflict among individuals with
divergent interests.
In the end, it should not be
surprising that courts are so
limited as an agency of public
policy. They are the institution
ultimately responsible for
allocating power among the
branches of the federal
government and the states;
defining free speech; structuring
religious liberty; setting the
boundaries of criminal procedure;
deciding when regulations exceed
the government's power to take
property without compensation;
specifying the minimal procedural
rights governmental agencies
must accord clients; writing some
of the basic rules for resolving
problems of race; interpreting
every federal statute; and much,
much more. Responsible for so
much, courts can understand
only a little. The government of
courts must be the government
of amateurs.
12
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ome years ago I wrote a book on detention without trial in wartime Britain; it was based
largely on archival material. It explored the interrelationship between ideology, law, the institutions of
government - such as the civil service, the security service, the courts, and Parliament - and public
opinion. It set out not to develop some high abstract theory, but more modestly to establish the narrative
history of locking up citizens without trial in the name of national self preservation. Who was locked up?
When? Why? What was it like? These and other very down to earth questions are what need to be asked,
and, if possible, answered. Only then can we tum to
analysis and evaluation.
My more recent book applies much the same
approach to the genesis and early history of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which
came into force in 1953. This has created far and
away the most effective international mechanism
for the protection of human rights which has yet
come into existence anywhere in the world. Like my
book on detention, it is primarily based on relatively
modern archival material in the British Public
Record Office, material which has largely remained
unexamined by international lawyers, or indeed
lawyers of any kind.
The most puzzling question which was the
starting point for my research can be stated very
simply. Three major powers emerged from the
second world war - the Soviet Union, the U.S.A.,
and the United Kingdom. But only one, the United
Kingdom, was prepared to sign up to a human
rights convention capable of having significant
domestic effect. The U.S.A. has never done so, and
it is only recently that the Russian federation has
made a gesture towards doing so.
Indeed, back in the 1950s no major power had
ever previously accepted anything remotely
resembling the surrender of sovereignty required by initial accession to the convention, and carried further
by acceptance, in 1966, of the right of individual petition, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Human
Rights. Why did the United Kingdom take this extraordinary step? What was in it for the British? And,
more generally, how did it come about that a number of states cooperated in 1949 and 1950 in negotiating
so remarkable an international instrument as the European Convention?
Plainly, the answer to this and related questions lies in the political history of the period. The context in
which the convention was promoted was affected by the evolution of the human rights movement during
the war, by the outbreak of the cold war, and by conflicts between the United Kingdom and the anti-colonial
movement, which found a platform in the United Nations. It was also affected by conflicts within the British
governmental machine, and by serious disagreements between the British Foreign Office and the U.S.A.
I have tried to tell the story of all this up to 1966, when the United Kingdom became fully committed to
the convention, and I have explored in detail the significance of the convention for a major colonial power
in the declining years of the empire. It was indeed against the United Kingdom, which had promoted the
convention in the first place, that the first cases were brought by Greece, cases arising out of the
attempt to suppress the colonial insurrection of 1955-59 in Cyprus. For government life was never
to be the same again.

FROM

the chapter "Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,"
in Human Ri{Jhts and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis
of the European Convention, by A. W. Brian Simpson,
Oxford University Press (2001).
THAT BRITAIN, OR INDEED ANY OTHER EUROPEAN POWER,

should sign up to even moderately effective mechanisms for the
protection of human rights is intrinsically surprising. The
convention was, as we shall see, to cause bitter regrets and indeed
outrage in some governmental circles once it began to have any
practical effect, and has continued to do so. Sir Hilton Poynton of
the Colonial Office prefaced a gloomy minute written in 1956,
when the chickens first came back to roost: "recognizing that we
have got ourselves committed to this wretched Covenant and can't
get out of it ~ow."
For human rights covenants, if they do anything at all, restrict
the power of governments over their own citizens, or over other
persons within their power. That is their function. They are
trouble to governments. Their very reason for existence is the
belief that governments are the major delinquents: "The history of
the struggles for the recognition of Human Rights is as much as
anything a struggle of the human being against the anonymous
machinery of authority, whether of the church or of the State."
Generally governments pursue what they think to be their
national interests, and insist on the right to run their own internal
affairs without outside interference. Traditionally international
law accepted this; matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
states - and this included matters turning on the rights of
individuals - were simply not its concern. States could
legitimately complain if their own nationals were ill used in other
countries; sometimes complaints might also be based on treaties,
relating either to nationals, or to members of minorities, usually
with some affinity to another 'kin' state. But in general states were
thought free to deal with their own people, and abuse them, as
they wished; this was an aspect of the conception of state
sovereignty. How did it come about that Britain, and certain other
European countries, voluntarily gave up some of their autonomy?
What did they think they were buying one half so precious as the
goods they traded in return? For governments do not, simply out of
disinterested benevolence, or through a lack of confidence in their
own rectitude, voluntarily surrender power. It has to be more
complicated than that.

earned an M.A. and a Doctorate
of Civil Law from Oxford
University. He was a fellow at
Lincoln College, Oxford, and is a
fellow of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences and the
British Academy. He has held
professorships at the University
of Kent and at the University of
Chicago. Professor Simpson's
publications include Human
Rights and the End of Empire:
Britain and the Genesis of the
European Convention;
A History of the Common Law of
Contract; A Biographical
Dictionary of the Common Law;
Cannibalism and the Common
Law; A History of the Land; Law,
Legal Theory and Legal History;
In the Highest Degree Odious:
Detention Without Trial in
Wartime Britain; and Leading
Cases in the Common Law.
He is the Charles F. and Edith J.
Clyne Professor of Law.
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hat is the appropriate
attitude for subjects to have toward the law?
How do legal systems present themselves to
subjects?
The first question is a question of political
theory, usually expressed by asking whether
citizens have a moral obligation to obey a
directive just because it is the law. The
second question is a question of legal theory:
what are the essential characteristics of legal
systems? Are they simply the largest
gangsters around, getting their way (most of
the time) because of their relative monopoly
on force? Or does a legal system at least
claim to be acting morally when it imposes
sanctions on lawbreakers? Do legal systems,
for that matter, claim authority in the sense of insisting that citizens have a duty to obey their laws?
That these questions, long debated by philosophers and legal theorists, continue to fascinate will not
surprise. What may come as a surprise to anyone who has not followed recent discussions is the curious
position that has emerged from the contemporary debate. The prevailing view about the first question is that
subjects have no moral obligation to obey the law; on the other hand, most theorists agree that legal systems
claim authority - legal systems claim that subjects have reason to follow directives just because they are the
law. The oddity of this position, ascribing to law a normative posture inconsistent with political theory,
provides the motivation for much of this study. The currently popular view that law claims authority but does
not have it is here reversed on both counts: I argue that law does not claim authority, but has it.
Though my focus in this book is on political obligation, I approach that issue indirectly by first developing
a more general account of when deference is due to the views of others. I consider, in particular, four
persistent areas of human interaction that have long served as central cases for inquiries into moral
obligation - four situations in which persons often disagree about what one ought to do and why. The aim
of the study is to show that these four cases (cases raising questions of duty in the case of law, of promises,
of fair play, and of friendship) share common features that are best illuminated by the concept of deference.
This book's central thesis was conceived some time ago. Giving shape to the initial conception, however,
proved more difficult than expected. One cause of the difficulty was the discovery that my own views
changed over time in ways that required modifying or revising work in progress. In earlier work I focused on
legal theory and what I took to be the implications of H.L.A. Hart's description of law as a normative system.
I suggested that this view of law made sense only when set against a background assumption that citizens
have an obligation to obey the law. Today, the normative character of law seems widely accepted by most
theorists, while the claim that there might be a general obligation to obey law remains increasingly suspect.
My own views during this time have also changed, but in a direction different from that reflected in the
current consensus. It now seems to me that the normative character of law is less robust than that reflected
in much of th, literature. At the same time, my views about political obligation, only hinted at in previous
work, have bel n reinforced and extended to areas beyond that of political obligation alone. The result is the
present work, where the focus this time is mostly on moral theory with legal theory providing the foreground.

The
Ethics of
Deference

FROM

the proposed text of The Ethics of Deference,
by Philip Soper (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press).
POLITICAL OBLIGATION POSES THE SAME QUESTION as
promissory obligation - why obey the legislative norm? The obvious
difference is that the content of the norm in the case of the state is not
usually the result of a voluntary choice on the part of the citizen. That
fact weakens the consistency explanation for respecting one's own
choice when confronted with the demand for compliance. In addition,
consequential arguments have little purchase because the context and
relationship have now been so diluted that no single act of
disobedience is likely to have significant effects on the community. But
these two ways in which the demand to show respect are weaker than
in the case of promises are offset by a compelling difference between
legal norms ap.d promissory norms: in the case of law, the point of the
state is evident - legal systems are necessary in a way that making
promises is not. Once again (with the usual exception for anarchists),
the law's expectation of voluntary compliance corresponds to what I
would also expect if I were the legislator. The duty to respect the legal
norm is a reflection of the duty to respect the values I myself
acknowledge in recognizing what a legal system is.
In summary, one can characterize the duty to defer in these cases
along several dimensions. Friendship, fair play, promise, and political
obligation are duties that are grounded in that order along a scale that
moves from consequential explanations to increasingly deontological
ones. The values of friendship and fair play are largely independent of
consent, and the values that deference promotes in each case become
more tenuous as one moves from the more intimate two-person
relationship to larger communities. Promissory duties give strangers
the same power as the state to demand compliance with self-created
norms, but this power is constrained in scope and creation by one's
own voluntary choice as to the content of the norm and the person of
the promisee. The state's right to deference, in contrast, arises not
from the subject's voluntary choice about the content of the legal
norms, but from the acknowledgement of the necessity of an
enterprise that requires designated authorities to impose norms, in
good faith, on the community at large.

holds undergraduate and
graduate degrees, including a
Ph.D. in philosophy, from
Washington University in
St. Louis. He graduated from
Harvard Law School in 1969 and
served the following year as
clerk to Justice Byron White of
the Supreme Court of the United
States. After completing work in
philosophy at Oxford, he spent
two years at the Council on
Environmental Quality in
Washington, D.C. Professor Soper
began his academic career at
Michigan in 1973 and is now the
James V. Campbell Professor of
Law. He teaches courses in
environmental law and contracts,
as well as in legal and moral
philosophy, and is the author of
A Theory of Law, Harvard
University Press ( 1984), as well
as numerous articles on legal
and political theory.
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hough we have no very good way
of talking about it, one of the deepest needs
of human beings - perhaps of all our
needs the one that is most distinctively
human - is for what we in English call
"meaning" in our experience. It is meaning
that we seek to create through our cultures,
those complex symbolic and expressive
practices ranging from music to politics,
football to religion, that occupy us so much
of the time; and meaning, perhaps in a
somewhat different sense, that each
individual seeks as he or she works through
the possibilities a~d choices of existence,
trying to make them add up to something
whole and coherent.
My own way of putting it is to say we
are constantly seeking to imagine the world,
and the self and others within it, in such a
way as to make it possible for us to engage
in coherent and intelligible speech, and
valuable and effective action. We want, that
is, a way of imagining life as a whole, on
which our own action and thought and
speech, our relations with others, can
sensibly and effectively be based. How is
this desire to be addressed, put to work, and connected with other desires and realities?
The Edge of Meaning emerges from an interest in this question, which it explores by examining a set of texts
and artifacts in which the author faces with particular intensity and richness the difficulties involved in this
activity of the imagination. It begins with Thoreau's claim in Walden to have found a way to imagine himself and
his world, his language and his mind, in such a way as to make life itself an activity of joyful and perpetual
creation. This is as pure an expression of the impulse I mean to identify as any I could think of. In the following
chapters I trace through what happens as this impulse meets impediments in the world and in the mind that
threaten it: in Huckleberry Finn, for example, where Huck is equally determined to make sense of the world and
himself, but is in the end unable to comprehend or deal with the externally determined, inwardly validated fact of
race, which makes the most important event of his life, his friendship with Jim, unsayable. Then I turn to
Odysseus, in the Odyssey, who must deal, not once but twice, with fundamental changes in his culture, which
require different ways of thinking and being, which he is, for the most part, remarkably able to achieve.
One important feature of our world that acts simultaneously, and paradoxically, as both an enablement and an
impediment is language. The next section of the book shows some of the ways that is so, through a
consideration of Homeric Greek (the language of the Odyssey), and the genre or form we call the sentence, as it
works in different languages. The center of the book is a reading of Plato's Phaedrus, as marvelous and rich and
complex a manifestation of the desire to imagine the whole world in a coherent way as any I know, with the
additional excellence that it constantly teaches and re-teaches its reader the force of the impediments and limits
any such effort must necessarily face.
The final three chapters examine three genres of expression and action that can be seen to offer us the
opportunity to function well on the understandings worked out so far: poetry (Frost and Herbert), law (the case of
Lee v. Weism1n), and painting (Vermeer). The passage that is excerpted here is an introduction to the chapter on
law; just befor~ it, I describe something of my own experience in thinking about and going to law school, and it
is with an allusion to that passage that this one begins.

FROM

the chapter "The Life of the Law as a Life of Writing," in The Edue of
Meanino, by James Boyd White, University of Chicago Press (2001).
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
IN THE PASSAGE THAT JUST PRECEDES THIS CHAPTER I describe

my own first exposure to law, which I saw as a fascinating activity of
mind, a way of engaging with language and the world. Suppose we
were to take that young law student as representing a certain stage in
the making of a lawyer - a stage a bit like that represented by
Thoreau at Walden, full of a sense of unlimited possibility - and ask,
What happens when such a one grows into the life of the law? I hope
that in exploring this question we may be able to bring into the
practical life of the present the large themes and questions presented
by the great works from the past that we have been reading. To this
end I shift my method slightly in this chapter, asking the reader to
imagine himself or herself a lawyer, or law student, facing the
questions that law presents its practitioners.
If you were thus to imagine yourself as the young lawyer or law
student I describe, setting forth into the world, I think you would find
yourself, like Huckleberry Finn, quickly meeting constraints of the
most serious kind. To start with, the laws with which you must work
are written by others, and they may of course be foolish, corrupt, or
immoral. Think for example of the laws of human slavery in our
collective past, and other laws of our own day: those that permit the
continued degradation of the natural world upon which we all depend,
for example, or those that fail to treat all of our chidren as people of
equal worth and value, or those that permit our penitentiaries to be
cesspools of crime; or, less dramatically, those that seem simply stupid
or ill drafted. You may come upon certain rules of law or judicial
decisions with which you profoundly disagree, others with which you
simply differ. But in either case as a lawyer you must take them as
authoritative, or challenge their authority only in certain established
and limited ways.
What is worse, whenever you go to work with the materials of the
law, trying to bring about a result that meets your client's interests,
that makes sense from his point of view, there is always someone on
the other side, challenging almost everything you say, trying to undo
what you are doing. And when you go to court you must face the
reality that judges and jurors can have all the limitations of human
beings, from stupidity to dishonesty to mere self-importance or
inattentiveness; yet it is to these people that you must speak and make
your case. And what about the outcomes of the cases in which you are
CONTINUED

is a graduate of Amherst College, Harvard
Law School, and Harvard Graduate School,
where he obtained an M.A. in English.
After graduation from law school, he
spent a year as a Sheldon Fellow in
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Law Institute and the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences. Professor White has
received fellowships from the
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books: The Legal Imagination (1973),
Constitutional Criminal Procedure (with
James Scarboro, 1976), When Words Lose
Their Meaning: Constitutions and
Reconstitutions of Language, Character,
and Community (1984), Heracles' Bow:
Essays in the Rhetoric and Poetics of the
Law (1985), Justice as Translation: An
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(1990), "This Book of Starres": Leaming
to Read George Herbert ( 1994), Acts of
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Literature, Law, and Politics ( 1994), From
Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law
and Legal Education (2000), and The Edge
of Meaning (2001).
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involved, or those that you invoke
as authority? You will often think
these plainly wrong, or unjust. In
any event, even when the "right"
side wins, there is almost always a
loser, a person or entity whose
voice and perspective are silenced,
and what is to be said about him or
her? In everything you do you must
recognize that the law is part of a
culture and a national political
community that are far from ideal,
in which you are implicated, yet of
which you may in important ways
want to be critical.
In addition, in our day it is easy
to imagine the law as a rather
mechanical institutional system,
designed by social architects or
engineers to achieve certain results
in the world, say an increased gross
national product or safer highways
or effective schools. This
perspective invites one to evaluate
law by testing actual against
designed outcomes, or by proposing
different outcomes and ways to
achieve them. To the extent the
lawyer thinks in this way - the
way of much social science - she
may find herself conceiving of her
own role in mechanistic terms, too,
as though she were really a cog in a
machine of social control whose
main virtue is efficiency of
operation, rather than a mind
confronting the realities of human
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experience, and the difficulties of
talking about it, and of shaping it,
in language. This mechanistic
image of her life is reinforced by
the common and necessary way of
talking about law practice in
accounting terms, as a business
whose end is profit.
Not all of these external limits or
constraints are as serious or
dramatic as those facing Huck
Finn, but some of them are or can
be, as the slavery example itself
suggests. Suppose you really were a
lawyer in a world in which human
slavery was supported - defined,
implemented, enforced - by the
law, and by lawyers: How would
you face that fact? Are there any
analogues to slavery in our own
world? Certainly people who
represent the poor and weak often
feel that they are up against an
impossibly powerful set of political
and intellectual forces that render
them helpless, their clients
unheard.
Finally, and in a sense much
worse, is the fact that many of the
constraints or defects we must face
are at work in our own minds and
characters. How do you as a lawyer
regularly imagine the human beings
about whom you speak: as having
what motives, what values, what
capacities, what experiences? How
do you imagine the larger world of
which you are part, and yourself
within it? Are these ways of
imaging adequate to your own
sense of the possibilities of human
life? Without quite knowing it you
may find yourself speaking a
language that trivializes or
dehumanizes others, or yourself;
and how can you be sure that has

not happened? Other people, after
all, often take an extremely dim
view of the ways lawyers talk
and think.
Your own mind' and values are
put into question in another way,
too, for you will often discover or think you discover - that the
law is wiser than you are, drawing
distinctions you have not thought
of, complicating what seem at first
to be easy questions, leading you to
recognize their real difficulty, and
so on. The very cultural forces you
want to be free to resist may in fact
have much to teach, and you
cannot be sure in any particular
case what response is the right one.
The criticism you want to make
proves more difficult than you at
first imagined. And what happens
when the legal culture changes, as
it surely must? You face then the
twin questions faced by Odysseus:
Can you adapt to the new world,
learn to speak its language, to make
the moves that carry persuasive
force? And what happens to you
when you do so?
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Other members of the
Law School community
also are authors and
writers. As we were
preparing this issue of
Law Quadrangle Notes

alone, several graduates
informed us of their
recently published
books. A visiting
professor and a current
student are book authors
as well. The group
includes a scholarly and
readable analysis of the
2000 presidential
election, an analysis of
the Russian federation,
an historical examination of the origins
and evolution of the
legal concepts of stalking,
novels, and others.
Coglianese, '90, considers
Regulating from the Inside

Harvard Associate Professor
of Public Policy Cary
Coglianese, '90, and his
co-editor Jennifer Nash,
director of the Regulatory
Policy Program at Harvard's
John F. Kennedy School of
Government, have assembled a
collection of essays that they
say "provides insights into the
potential value of EMSs
[environmental management
systems] as well as their
implications for public policy."
Coglianese, who also chairs
the Regulatory Policy Program
at Harvard's Center for
Business and Government, and
Nash say that "a major goal" of
Regulating from the Inside: Can

0 N l Hf

Environmental Management
Systems Achieve Policy Goals?
(RFF Press, 2001) "has been to
set the future agenda for
research on EMSs."
"Unlike public regulation,
which imposes requirements on
organizations from the outside,
an EMS consists of a regulatory
structure that arises from
within an organization," they
explain. "An EMS represents a
collection of internal efforts at
policymaking, planning, and
implementation that yields
benefits for the organization as
well as potential benefits for
society at large."
Regulating from the Inside
divides its essays into sections
on "Motivations and Impacts"
and on "Implications for Public
Policy." Donald F. Kettl, of the
Robert M. La Follette School of
Public Affairs at the University
of Wisconsin-Madison, notes in
his Foreword that "the efforts
described in this book are in
their infancy, but they are
intriguing and promising." He
adds: "This book is really about
the strategic use of information
as a governance tool - and the
possibility of substituting
information for traditional
governmental authority."

Abner Greene, '86, draws
road map for Election 2000
Abner Greene, '86, has retraced the 2000 presidential
election like the Fordham
University law professor that
he is - step by step,
evenhandedly, thoroughly, with
a nonpartisan critic's scalpel and concludes that the
law won.
Yes, George Bush won the
hotly contested election, even
though Al Gore had more
popular votes. Yes, the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately
decided the outcome of the
election, but by analyzing the
law, not declaring the winner.
All in all, Greene says in his
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book Understanding the 2000
Election: A Guide to the Legal
Battles that Decided the
Presidency (New York
University Press, 2001), "just
as politics provides a buffer
zone between citizens, defusing
potential violence, so does law
streamline the rough and
tumble of politics into a forum
of principle, which exists even
amid the most contentious
political strife."
To read Greene's book is to
recall in detail the confusion,
heated discussions, and
microscopic examination of one
state's electoral machinery (a
state that just happened to have
one presidential candidate's
brother in the governor's chair)
that accompanied those
uncertain days of fall 2000. He
takes his readers back to the
U.S. Constitution and its
establishment of the Electoral
College, that unique, censusdriven voting machine that
made Florida's 25 electoral
votes critical in the 2000
election.
His primer is elegantly
simple: "When we vote for
president, we are technically
voting for other people - diehard party loyalists, often state
or local officials - who are
committed to voting for the
candidate we want. So when
we vote for 'Al Gore' or 'George
W. Bush; we are voting for
Gore or Bush electors who have
been lined up to cast their
electoral votes for those
candidates .... each state
receives as many electoral votes
as it has members of Congress.
So each state starts off with two
electoral votes, representing the
two senators from each state,
and then adds as many electoral
votes as it has members of the
House of Representatives."
Of course, from there things
get more complicated, as voters,
candidates, and the courts
CONTINUED
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Continued from page 19

discovered in fall 2000:
"Counting by Hand," is one
section of Greene's book,
"The Bush Attack on the
Florida Supreme Court"
another, "The End of the
Road," "The Wild-Card
Lawsuits," and "The Legislative
Role" still others.
And in the end the law won,
Greene says. Yes, many
consider the law to be the
United States' "civil religion,"
he writes, but "it is also, I
believe, our way of avoiding the
brutality of unmediated politics.
Political struggle is just a step
removed from real, literal
struggle: human beings with
vastly different notions of the
good life thrown together in
cities and towns, with violence
always beckoning. Through
politics, we allow
representatives to do our
bidding for us, and, if politics
goes well, it can be
accomplished peacefully."
Good lawyer and dedicated
law professor that he is, Greene
takes no measure of the
correctness of the legal
decisions the conflicts of
Election 2000 produced.
Instead, he praises the
reasoned, principled approach
that uses the law as the
measure and locus of the bases
for making a decision - not
the decision its elf.
"Reasons were given that
were defensible from statutory
text or judicial precedent;
opposing views were canvassed
and rejected through argument;
difficult questions were
resolved by reference to
principle, rather than politics,"
Greene writes.
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"Instead of covering riots to
resolve power struggles, the
press was able to turn its
cameras and microphones to
courtrooms, judges, lawyers,
and clerks of the court. The
mediating force of law held,
keeping violence at bay. We
experienced, as a nation,
another peaceful transition of
government. It was a transition
accomplished through the
rough and tumble of politics,
but also through the civilizing
force oflaw."

'Sweet tooth' spy novels
do well for Hershatter, '51

Richard L. Hershatter, '51,
who attended his 50th reunion
at the Law School in
September, reports that his
three tongue-in-cheek spy
novels - The Spy Who Hated
Licorice, The Spy Who Hated
Caramel, and The Spy Who
Hated Fudge - written in the
late 1960s and early '70s, have
all been reissued by iUniverse,
under arrangement with The
Mystery Writers of America.
The books' hero is a freshlyminted product of the
University of Michigan Law
School who is called into
service by the Defense
Intelligence Agency as Secret
Agent 6-X. Hershatter uses the
same hero in a newly released
courtroom mystery, Hung]ury,
available in soft cover.
Hershatter is completing
another book in the Secret
Agent 6-X series, to be called
The Spy Who Hated Taffy. He
reports that if his "sweet tooth
lasts, there may be no end" to
the series.
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Law student Jeffrey Kahn
analyzes Russian federalism

Third-year law student
Jeffrey D. Kahn (no relation
to Paul A. Kauper Professor of
Law Douglas A. Kahn) has
spent much of this fall term in
the final stages of editing,
proofing, and indexing his new
book on Russia's struggle to
develop a modern federal
system, to be published by
Oxford University Press this
spring. The book is entitled
Federalism, Democratization
and the Rule of Law in Russia.
Kahn, who is also a graduate
student instructor for the
Center for Russian and East
European Studies in the
University's College of
Literature, Science and the
Arts, earned his bachelor's
degree at Yale University and
completed his doctoral work in
political science at St. Antony's
College, Oxford University. He
approaches his study through
the disciplines of political
science, law, and Russian area
studies. In addition to working
with materials in the Law
School's own extensive Russian
collection, much of the original
research for the book comes
from his widespread travel
experience in Russia - from
the North Caucasus to Far
Eastern Siberia - where Kahn
conducted interviews with
former and current government
officials, lawyers, academics,
and political dissidents.
According to the abstract for
the book: "Russia's political
elite have struggled to build an
extraordinarily complex federal
system, one that incorporates
89 different units and scores of
different ethnic groups, which
sometimes harbor long histories
of resentment against Russian
imperial and soviet legacies.
"This book examines the
public debates, official
documents, and political deals
that built Russia's federal house
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on very unsteady foundations,
often out of the ideological,
conceptual, and physical rubble
of the ancien regime. One of the
major goals of this book is,
where appropriate, to bring
together the insights of
comparative law and
comparative politics in the
study of the development of
Russia's attempts to create
(as its constitution states in the
very first article) a 'democratic,
federal, rule of law state.' "

Kamir, LL.M. '95, S.J.D. '96
follows stalking's trail

Orit Kamir, LL.M., '95,
S.].D. '96, follows the trail of
the myths and tales of stalkers
from ancient to modern times
- and examines the recent
laws that have resulted in Every
Breath You Take: Stalking
Narratives and the Law
(University of Michigan Press,
2001). Kamir is a professor of
law at Hebrew University in
Jerusalem and is a visiting
professor here at the Law
School during the winter
2002 term.
Kamir's research reaches
back thousands of years and
continues through contemporary
stalker tales like the movies
Taxi Driver and Play Misty for
Me. Her work reveals ancient
tales of both male and female
stalkers and hoary concepts
that remain unnerving today.
"Like ghosts, they haunt our
lives and alter our behavior,"
she writes.
And those ghosts influence
our laws, she says: "The
antistalking legislation of the
1990s regenerated in legal form
an ancient fear freighted with a
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cultural legacy of perceptions
and connotations that began to
accumulate within Western
culture perhaps as early as five
thousand years ago. When
integrated into our
contemporary legal system, the
fear of stalking carried with it
faint echoes and images of
worlds haunted by supernatural
creatures, cosmic quests, and
tragic fates. Making their
acquaintance enables us to
better understand how we, as
lawyers, judges, stalkers,
targets, and potential jurors,
feel and think when we
encounter stalking."
Kamir introduces you to
female stalkers, like the ancient
Mesopotamian night-stalking
female demon Lilit (or Lilith),
as well as male stalkers like
Satan and the serial killer
Michael in the film Halloween.
She also analyzes the findings
of the 1998 National Institute
ofJustice report on stalking,
which estimated that 8 percent
of women and two percent of
men in the United States have
been stalked ("a course of
conduct directed at a specific
person that involves repeated
physical or visual proximity,
nonconsensual communication,
or verbal, written or implied
threats" - a definition broader
than the "credible threat" that
much antistalking legislation
uses as a threshold) and
concludes that "the social
phenomenon of stalking that is
troubling contemporary U.S.
society is, above all, an abusive
behavior committed by men on
women."
"In this respect," she writes,
stalking "is a form of
patriarchal oppression,
maintaining women's
subjugation to men through
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violence, aggression, control,
and surveillance and thus
perpetuating discrimination
against them and preventing
social equality."
Kamir's insights and
analyses also reflect her
experience on the political
front. She drafted the sexual
harassment bill that was passed
into law in 1998 by the Israeli
Parliament, where she
previously had clerked. She also
has clerked for the Israeli
Supreme Court and served as
legal advisor to Israeli
organizations like the Israel
Women's Network.

Bruce Kreisman, '82,
goes Off the Bench
Bruce Kreisman, '82, who
is with the tax accounting firm
Kessler Orlean & Silver in
Illinois, has published his first
novel, Off the Bench (Salvo
Press, 2001), a mystery
centered around a secret group
of attorneys who are willing to
use even murder and
kidnapping to improve civility
in the courts.
"In writing Off the Bench I
followed the timeless advice to
write what you know,"
Kreisman says, so "my
experiences as a litigation
attorney in Chicago provide
much of the inspiration for the
book." Ann Arbor gets into the
book, too: One character is
modeled after a University of
Michigan football player.
Here's Salvo Press' synopsis:
"In Chicago, the courtroom can
be a rough place, where short
tempers and bruised egos are
part of the job. But, while some
days are difficult, others are
killers.
"When recovering attorney
and current private investigator
Martin Bronk is called on by a
judge to find his missing clerk,
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he has no idea what he is
getting himself into. His
investigation quickly changes
when an ill-tempered veteran
judge and a well-liked young
attorney are found dead. Both
could be the work of a secret
group trying to bring civility
and order to the court. Bronk
must question his friendship
with his colleagues and then
fight for his own life to solve
the case."

Eric W. Orts, '88, evaluates
Environmental Contracts
Eric W. Orts, '88, professor
of legal studies and director of
the Environmental
Management Program at the
University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School, has teamed
with a Belgian colleague to
compare U.S. and European
innovations in environmental
regulation.
Orts and Kurt Deketelaere,
of the Institute for
Environmental & Energy Law
in Lueven, are co-editors of
Environmental Contracts:
Comparative Approaches to
Regulatory Innovation in the
United States and Europe
(Kluwer Law International, the
Hague, 2000). The collection is
the first in Kluwer's
Comparative Environmental
Law & Policy Series.
Says Kluwer's abstract:
"This book focuses on the
viability of one particular
regulatory innovation - the
use of agreements or contracts
for environmental regulation as it has been practiced in the
United States and Europe. The
various contributions explore
the general idea that certain
kinds of environmental
problems may best be addressed
through contracts among
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interested parties, including
representatives of various levels
of government, business, local
community and employment
representatives, and public
interest groups."
Orts and Deketelaere divide
Environmental Contracts into
four parts: Part I focuses on the
United States, Part II on
Europe, Part III on the law and
economics of environmental
contract regulation, and Part IV
concludes the book with "A
Comparative Study: Electricity
and Contracts."
1

Gerald Prokopowicz, '83,
follows Army of the Ohio
Gerald]. Prokopowicz,
'83, has written All for the
Regiment: The Army of the Ohio
1861-1862, published in June
by the University of North
Carolina Press.
Prokopowicz is the Lincoln
Scholar and director of public
programs at The Lincoln
Museum in Fort Wayne,
Indiana.
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